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Abstract
We develop a Schumpeterian growth model that differs from the quality-ladder model in the
following two ways. First, the size of the quality increment is determined by a random draw from
a given distribution, and consequently leader firms are different in terms of their quality lead over
their followers, and thus have different profit flows. Second, we assume that the R&D technology
of leader firms exhibits diminishing returns, and consequently some leader firms engage in R&D
activities. The results show that leaders with larger quality leads over their followers make smaller
R&D investments and tend to be replaced more rapidly; this result is consistent with the behaviors of
some previous leader firms such as Sony and Eastman–Kodak. Moreover, we show that subsidizing
followers’ R&D can promote leaders’ aggregate R&D. Subsidies for followers’ R&D promote their
R&D and impede individual leader firms’ R&D. However, promotion of followers’ R&D decreases
the number of leaders with larger quality leads and smaller R&D investments and increases that of
leaders with smaller quality leads and larger R&D investments. If this positive effect from a changed
distribution outweighs the negative effects on individual firms’ R&D, promotion of followers’ R&D
increases leaders’ aggregate R&D.
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1 Introduction
In developed economies, total factor productivity (hereafter, TFP) growth from research and development
(hereafter, R&D) activities is the most important source of sustained economic growth. Since the seminal
contributions by Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992), many studies have
developed R&D-based growth models and examined how aggregate R&D activities and the growth rate
of output are determined. However, most of the earlier studies have two features that are not consistent
with the evidence. First, in most of the earlier studies, innovation is conducted by new entrants or
follower firms, not by the leader that has the state-of-the-art technology in each industry. In reality, in
many industries, the leader firm conducts R&D activities and contributes to innovation. For instance,
Bartelsman and Doms (2000) report that 75 percent of TFP growth results from R&D activities by the
incumbent firms. Second, in most of the earlier studies, profits from innovation are symmetric among
firms. However, in reality, the profits from innovation differ among firms. Indeed, commencing with
Scherer (1965), many empirical studies have examined the distribution of profits among firms.
In order to construct an R&D-based growth model that is consistent with this evidence, we assume
that (i) R&D technology of leader firms exhibits decreasing returns and (ii) the size of the quality incre-
ment is determined by a random draw from a given distribution. As a result, we develop a Schumpeterian
growth model where leader firms have different profits and some of them conduct R&D activities. Ex-
amining this heterogeneous-leaders model, first, we find the following interesting tendency in the leader
firms’ behaviors. The leader that has higher quality compared with its followers and earns larger profits
makes smaller R&D investments. The reason is as follows. The leader loses the value of their current po-
sition when they succeed in the next innovation. Therefore, the net benefit of R&D for the leader that has
a larger quality lead over their followers is higher, and thus a higher-quality leader has lower R&D ex-
penditure. Consequently, a higher-quality leader is more likely to be leapfrogged by the other firms. This
theoretical result is consistent with actual firm behavior. Sony succeeded in developing the high-quality
flat cathode-ray tube TV and did not invest in the development of a liquid crystal TV. Consequently,
Sony did not obtain a large share of the market for liquid crystal TVs. Eastman–Kodak, which was the
earliest developer of film cameras, went bankrupt because of the diffusion of digital cameras.1 Second,
we examine the effects of subsidizing followers’ R&D and obtain a counter-intuitive result. R&D sub-
sidies for followers promote R&D by followers naturally. However, this promotion of followers’ R&D
can also promote aggregate R&D by leaders. The reason is as follows. The promotion of followers’
1Carroll and Mui(2008) mentioned that Polaroid as well as Eastman–Kodak did not spend enough on digital photography
because it got larger gross margin of the existing business, that is, film photography.
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R&D impedes R&D by leaders. However, the promotion of followers’ R&D also shifts the distribution
of leaders; it reduces the number of leaders with larger leads and smaller R&D investment and increases
that of leaders with smaller leads and larger R&D investment. If this positive effect associated with the
changing distribution outweighs the negative effects on individual firms’ R&D, the promotion of fol-
lowers’ R&D increases leaders’ aggregate R&D. This result implies that R&D subsidies for new entry
firms are effective in raising aggregate productivity growth, and provides a rationale for actual promotion
policies for R&D activities by new entry firms.2
Some earlier studies including Thompson and Waldo (1994), Segerstrom and Zornierek (1999),
Etro (2004), Segerstrom (2007), Ledezma(2013), and Acemoglu and Cao (2015) developed R&D-based
growth models where the leader firms conduct R&D activities and reexamined how aggregate R&D is
determined. However, in the models, there is no factor that brings about heterogeneity among the leaders,
and thus the leader firms are symmetric among industries. In contrast, Minniti, Parello, and Segerstrom
(2013) incorporate uncertainty of innovation size (quality increment) into Segerstrom (1998) and con-
struct a Schumpeterian growth model where the innovation size and profits are different among industry
leaders. However, this study assumes that R&D technology has constant returns, and thus the leader
firms do not conduct R&D activities in equilibrium. Therefore, constructing a realistic model where the
R&D activities of leaders are different is one of the contributions of the present study.3
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops a heterogeneous-leaders Schum-
peterian growth model and derives the equilibrium of the model. Section 3 conducts comparative statics.
Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
As stated in the Introduction, we extend the quality-ladder model of Grossman and Helpman (1991)
so that (i) the R&D technology of the leader firms exhibits decreasing returns and (ii) innovation size,
namely the quality increment, is stochastic. By doing so, we develop a Schumpeterian growth model
where the leader firms have different quality increments and profits, and further conduct different vol-
umes of R&D activities.
2For instance, one of the innovation-promoting policies that the European Commission decided to implement in “Innovation
Union” was to promote entry and R&D activities by small and medium-sized enterprises (European Commission, 2010).
3Chu (2011) developed the quality ladder model where there are heterogeneous industries and thus there are heterogeneous
R&D firms. However, leader firms do not conduct R&D activities due to constant returns of R&D technology as in Minniti,
Parello, and Segerstrom (2013).
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2.1 Consumers and workers
The economy has a fixed measure L of consumers. Intertemporal utility is given by:
U =
Z 1
0
e t

log u(t) + (`  `(t)) dt;
where  is a subjective discount rate, `(t) denotes supplied labor at time t, ` denotes the maximum
labor supply, and u(t) represents utility from consumption at time t.4 We specify utility per capita from
consumption as follows:
log u(t) =
Z 1
0
log
X
j
q(j; !; t)d(j; !; t)d!; (1)
where q(j; !; t) and d(j; !; t) denote the jth-highest quality in industry ! and the consumption volume
of the good, respectively.
Solving the utility maximization problem of the household, we now derive the demand for each
differentiated good ! 2 [0; 1]. First, in each differentiated goods industry, households consume only the
good with the lowest quality-adjusted price, which is provided by the firm having the highest quality in
equilibrium. Letting p(!; t) denote the price of the highest quality in industry !, the demand for the
good with the highest quality in industry ! is given by:
d(!; t) =
E(t)
p(!; t)
; (2)
where E(t) denotes per capita consumption. Substituting the demand into the utility, we can derive the
indirect utility as:
log u(t) = logE(t) 
Z 1
0
ln

p(!; t)
q(!; t)

dj

:
Second, we must solve the dynamic optimization problem as follows:
max
Z 1
0
e t

logE(t) 
Z 1
0
ln

p(!; t)
q(!; t)

dj

+ (`  `(t))

dt;
subject to
_a(t) = r(t)a(t) + w(t)`(t)  E(t);
where a(t) denotes the asset holding per capita and w(t) denotes the wage rate. We take the wage rate
as a numeraire, therefore w(t) = 1. As long as `(t) < `, 1 = w(t)E(t) must hold. This optimality condition
can be reduced to E(t) = 1, and thus from the Euler equation,
_E(t)
E(t) = r(t)  , we get r(t) = ; that is,
the interest rate is constant over time. Hereafter, we let r denote the constant interest rate.
4Labor supply is assumed to be perfectly elastic as in Aghion, Harris, and Vickers (1997). As a result, utility is quasilinear.
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2.2 Firms
In each industry, there are different qualities that consumers can buy. However, as mentioned before,
consumers buy only the good with the lowest quality-adjusted price.
Hereafter, we refer to the firm producing the highest quality in each industry as the leader and refer to
the other firms conducting R&D activities so as to leapfrog the leader as followers. If a firm succeeds in
achieving quality improvement, the quality increases by , which we assume is determined by a random
draw from a given distribution. If the highest quality in industry ! is q(!) before innovation, the quality
of the new leader is given by q(!) while the quality of its followers is q(!). In each industry, the leader
charges a price so that the followers cannot earn a positive profit. Therefore, the leader charges a price
equal to the quality lead . Thus the profit per consumer is given by (t) = (p(!; t) 1)d(!; t) = 1  1 .
Originally, we identify leaders with quality increments  that are obtained by their innovations.
However, for analytical simplicity, we assume that profit per consumer  is among [0; ], and hereafter
we identify leaders with profit sizes of  2 [0; ] and refer to the leader with profit  as -leader.
We let V () and I() denote the value and R&D intensity of -leader respectively. The R&D tech-
nology of leaders is assumed to exhibit diminishing returns. By devoting C2 I()
2dt units of labor in
infinitesimal time interval dt, the leaders will succeed in the invention of new quality with probability
I()dt. In addition, for analytical simplicity, we assume that once new quality is invented, the previous
quality becomes public domain, that is, any other firms can produce the previous quality. On this assump-
tion, the value of the leader who obtains quality lead  is simply V () where  = 1   1= irrespective
of the previous quality of the leader. Therefore, the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation (hereafter, HJB
equation) of the -leader is given by:
rV () = max
I()

L  C
2
[I()]2 + I() [EV   V ()]  IFV ()

; (3)
where EV is the expected value of the firm that succeeds in innovating and IF is the probability of
innovation by followers. Letting g() denote the distribution of , we can express EV as follows:
EV  E[V ()] =
Z 
0
V ()g()d:
From (3), the first-order condition for leaders is:
EV   V () = CI(): (4)
if EV  V (), otherwise I() = 0.
The firms other than the leaders, that is, the followers, also conduct R&D activities. Next, we con-
sider the behaviors of the followers. We let VF denote the value of a follower. The HJB equation of
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the follower is: rVF = max
IF

0  (1  sF ) CF IF + IF [EV   0]
	
, where CF denotes the R&D cost
for followers and sF denotes the R&D subsidy rate for followers. The R&D equilibrium condition for
followers is:
EV = (1  sF ) CF  CF (5)
and thus we get VF = 0.
3 Equilibrium
We derive the equilibrium in the present model and effects of subsidies for followers’ R&D on -leader’s
R&D, followers’ R&D, and aggregate R&D by leaders, and the sum of leaders’ R&D and followers’
R&D.
3.1 R&D by leaders
First, we derive the equilibrium R&D of -leader I() given IF .
From the first-order condition of R&D for leaders (4) and the equilibrium condition of R&D for
followers (5), we get:
CI() =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
CF   V () if 0  V ()  CF ;
0 if V () > CF :
(6)
For the leaders with a stock value that satisfies 0  V ()  CF , substituting the first-order condition
into the HJB equation (3) yields the quadratic equation with respect to V () as follows:
V () =
L+ 12C [CF   V ()]2
r + IF
: (7)
For the leaders with a stock value that satisfies V () > CF , they conduct no R&D activity and the stock
value consists of only profit flow as follows:
V () =
L
r + IF
:
For the leader with the stock value that satisfies V () = CF ,
CF =
L
r + IF
:
6
0 
V ()
CF
I() > 0 I() = 0
L
r + IF
Figure 1: The value of -leader
We define the critical level of profit in terms of whether the leader conducts R&D activities or not as ,
and  is given by:
 = (r + IF )
CF
L
: (8)
As a result, if the profit flow  exceeds the critical level, the leader with profit flow  conducts no R&D
activity, and the stock value is given by L=(r + IF ), which satisfies V () > CF . If the profit flow 
is lower than the critical level, the leader conducts R&D activities, and the stock value is given by the
smaller solution of the quadratic equation (7), which satisfies V () < CF , as shown in Fig. 1. The stock
value is given by:
V () =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
CF + (r + IF )C   C
r
(2
CF
C
+ r + IF )(r + IF )  2 L
C
if 0    ;
L
r + IF
if  <   :
(9)
Substituting the stock value into the optimality condition for R&D (6), given IF , we obtain -leader’s
R&D as follows:
I() =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
r
(2
CF
C
+ r + IF )(r + IF )  2L
C
   (r + IF ); if 0    ;
0 if  <   :
(10)
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(10) shows that the innovation intensity of the leader is a decreasing function of . Therefore, we can
summarize the result in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 The leader that has higher quality compared with followers and earns higher profit makes
a smaller R&D investment.
This result implies that leaders that obtain larger leads over follower firms have lower R&D expendi-
ture. This theoretical result is consistent with some actual firms’ behaviors. For instance, Sony succeeded
in developing the high-quality flat cathode-ray tube TV and did not invest in the development of a liquid
crystal TV. Consequently, Sony did not obtain a large share of the market for liquid crystal TVs.
In addition, some empirical studies show that R&D investment by smaller firms accounts for a large
proportion of important innovations. 5 This paper’s result is consistent with this tendency.
3.2 R&D by followers
Next, we derive the equilibrium R&D of followers IF .
In the rest of the analysis, we assume that the distribution of profit is a uniform distribution over
[0; ] for analytical simplicity. Hereafter, we use R  r + IF instead of IF , and we use ~CF  CF =C
and A  L=C for notational simplicity. We can calculate the expected value of V () as follows:
E[V ()] =
Z 
0
V ()g()d +
Z 

V ()g()d
=
C
A

( ~CF +R) ~CFR+
1
3

R3  
h
(2 ~CF +R)R
i 3
2

+
C
2A

(A)2
R
  ~C2FR

:
We can rewrite this as follows:
E[V ()] =
C
A
G(R)
where
G(R; cF ) 

( ~CF +R) ~CFR+
1
3

R3  
h
(2 ~CF +R)R
i 3
2

+
1
2

(A)2
R
  ~C2FR

:
This expected value must satisfy the R&D equilibrium condition for followers (5), and thus we get:
G(R; ~CF ) = A ~CF : (11)
This equation determines the equilibrium value of R.
As shown in Appendix A, we can show that dR
d ~CF
< 0. Thus, we can summarize the result as follows:
5According to Scherer (1984), companies with fewer than 1,000 employees were responsible for 47.3 percent of important
innovations, while large companies with over 10,000 employees were responsible for only 34.5 percent of important innova-
tions.
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0 
I()0
dI()
dCF
I(0)
I()
Figure 2: The effects of subsidies for followers’ R&D on leaders’ R&D
Proposition 2 A decrease in R&D costs for followers from, for example, subsidies promotes followers’
R&D.
3.3 Effects of R&D subsidies for followers on leaders’ R&D
We have shown that subsidies for followers’ R&D promote followers’ R&D. Now we examine the effects
of subsidies for followers’ R&D on leaders’ R&D.
Differentiating (10), we get:
dI()
d ~CF
=
1
I() +R
h
~CF   I()
i dR
d ~CF
+R

: (12)
As shown in Appendix B, if the elasticity of followers’ R&D with respect to R&D costs is sufficiently
high to satisfy the condition
Condition (R)  
~CF
R
dR
d ~CF
>
~CF
R+ ~CF
;
the effect of an increase in ~CF on I() is an increasing function of I(), as depicted in Fig. 2. We can
summarize the result as follows:
Proposition 3 If the elasticity of followers’ R&D with respect to R&D subsidies is sufficiently high to
satisfy Condition (R), the effect of subsidies for followers’ R&D on -leader’s R&D decreases as 
increases.
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Next, we examine the effect of an increase in ~CF on the R&D of the -leader, the leader with the
minimum profit who conducts no R&D activity. When I() = 0, we can rewrite (12) as follows:
dI()
d ~CF
=
~CF
R
dR
dCF
+ 1: (13)
Therefore, if the elasticity of followers’ R&D is sufficiently high to satisfy the following condition,
Condition (R’)  
~CF
R
dR
d ~CF
> 1;
R&D subsidies for followers make the leader who conducts no R&D investment do it.6
3.4 Effects on aggregate R&D by leaders
In this section, we examine how aggregate R&D by leaders is determined and examine the effects of
subsidies for followers’ R&D on aggregate R&D by leaders.
We let (; t) denote the distribution of -leaders, and thus we can express the aggregate innovation
of leaders as follows:
IL(t) =
Z 
0
I()(; t)d: (14)
We derive the stationary distribution of -leaders. The inflow of -leaders in time interval dt is a
proportion g() of the number of leaders and followers that succeed in innovation at the interval, that is,
(IL(t)dt + IFdt)g(). The outflow of -leaders is the sum of the number of -leaders that succeed in
innovation in the interval and that of followers that target the industries of present -leaders and succeed
in innovation in the interval, that is, [I()dt+ IFdt](; t). Therefore, the change in the distribution of
-leaders is given by:
@(; t)
@t
= (IL(t) + IF )g()  [I() + IF ](; t): (15)
We focus our analysis on the stationary distribution for simplicity. Then, from (15), we obtain the
stationary distribution of the leaders as follows:
() =
IL + IF
I() + IF
1

: (16)
Substituting (16) into (14) yields the equation that determines the equilibrium leaders’ aggregate
R&D IL as follows:
IL =
Z 
0
IL + IF
I() + IF
1

I()d: (17)
6On the assumption that profit is uniformly distributed, this case does not hold. However, we may be able to show that this
case holds if we generalize the distribution of profit.
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0 
0
I()
 
()
IL+IF
IF
1

Figure 3: Change in the stationary distribution of leaders
Now, we examine effects of subsidies for followers’ R&D on aggregate R&D by leaders IL. As
mentioned above, if the elasticity of followers’ R&D is lower, subsidies for followers’ R&D tend to
decrease leaders’ R&D irrespective of the profit level of the leader. Regardless, subsidies for followers’
R&D may increase aggregate R&D by leaders. Subsidies for followers’ R&D affect the aggregate R&D
by leaders through the following two channels. First, subsidies for followers’ R&D affect the R&D
level of each leader. We refer to this effect as the individual effect. Through this effect, subsidies
necessarily reduce the aggregate R&D by leaders, as depicted in the upper panel of Fig. 3. Second,
they change the stationary distribution of -leader. Subsidies for followers’ R&D promote followers’
R&D IF . From the stationary distribution (16), an increase in IF increases (decreases) the distribution
of the -leader that conducts higher (lower) levels of R&D than the average level of R&D by leaders,
that is, I() > (<)IL, as depicted in the lower panel of Fig. 3. From Proposition 1, leaders with lower
profits conduct higher levels of R&D. Therefore, through the change in the distribution, followers’ R&D
increased by subsidies raises the aggregate R&D by leaders. We refer to this effect as the distribution
effect. If the distribution effect overwhelms the individual effect, subsidies for followers’ R&D raise the
aggregate R&D by leaders.
By providing numerical examples, we show that subsidies for followers’ R&D raise the aggregate
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growth rate
Figure 4: Aggregate R&D by leaders, followers’ R&D, and growth rate of u(t)
In the left panel, the solid line represents the aggregate R&D by leaders and the broken line represents followers’ R&D IF .
R&D by leaders under certain parameter values..7 In the numerical example, we use the following
parameters:  = 0:07;  = 0:4; A( L=C) = 1, and ~CF 2 [0:4; 2:75]. First, Mehra and Prescott (1985)
estimated the average real return on the stock market for the past century as 7%, and thus we set the
interest rate at this level. In this model, r(t) = , and we set the subjective discount rate at 0.07. Second,
empirical studies such as Norrbin (1993) and Basu (1996) estimate the range of markup of price over
marginal cost as [1.05, 1.4]. Thus we set the upper value of the profit  at 0.4 so that the expected profit
equals 0.2, which is obtained when the markup is 1.25, that is, in the middle of the estimated range.
Finally, we choose the value of A and the range of ~CF so that the range of the growth rate of the utility
is realistic as the range of the GDP per capita growth rate.8
As shown in the left panel of Fig. 4, under larger followers’ R&D costs, a decrease in followers’ R&D
costs increases the aggregate R&D by leaders, while under smaller followers’ R&D costs, it decreases
the aggregate R&D by leaders. We can surmise the reason for this result as follows. When followers’
R&D costs are smaller, followers’ R&D is larger, as shown in the left panel of Fig. 4. This makes
the distribution of leaders flatter and the increase in aggregate R&D by leaders through the distribution
effect tends to be smaller, and thus overwhelmed by the decrease in aggregate R&D by leaders through
the individual effect.
7On the assumption that profit is uniformaly distributed, we can derive aggregate R&D by leaders, IL as a function of
followers’ R&D IF as shown in Appendix C, and we can provide the numerical examples easily.
8We derive the growth rate of the utility in this model later.
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3.5 Effects on aggregate R&D
Next, we examine how the aggregate R&D, that is, the sum of R&D by followers and R&D by leaders, is
determined. Rewriting the definition of IL (17), we get the equation of the aggregate R&D I( IL+IF )
as follows: 9
1
IL + IF
=
Z 
0
1
I() + IF
1

d +
Z 

1
IF
1

d: (18)
This equation determines the equilibrium aggregate R&D I . Differentiating (18) with respect to ~CF
yields:
1
I2
dI
d ~CF
=
Z 
0
1
[I() + IF ]
2

dI()
d ~CF
+
dIF
d ~CF

1

d +
Z 

1
IF
2
dIF
d ~CF
1

d:
By using (12), we can rewrite dI()
d ~CF
+ dIF
d ~CF
as follows:
dI()
d ~CF
+
dIF
d ~CF
=
1
I() +R
h
~CF   I()
i dR
d ~CF
+R

+
dR
d ~CF
=
1
I() +R

~CF +R
 dR
d ~CF
+R

: (19)
If Condition (R) holds, subsidies for followers’ R&D increase the sum of leaders’ R&D and followers’
R&D in each industry where leaders’ R&D is positive irrespective of the profit of the industry leader.
From Proposition 2, the interior of the brace in the RHS of (19) is necessarily negative, and thus we can
get the result of the effects on the aggregate R&D as in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 If the elasticity of followers’ R&D with respect to R&D costs is sufficiently high to satisfy
Condition (R), subsidies for followers’ R&D increase the sum of leaders’ R&D and followers’ R&D in
each industry, and consequently increase the aggregate R&D.
This result implies that if the elasticity of followers’ R&D with respect to R&D subsidies is higher, R&D
subsidies for new entry firms tend to be effective in raising aggregate productivity growth.
9Dividing both sides of (17) by IL + IF yields
IL
IL + IF
=
Z 
0
I()
I() + IF
1

d:
Subtracting both sides of this equation from one, we get
IF
IL + IF
=
Z 
0
IF
I() + IF
1

d:
Dividing both sides of this equation by IF , we get (18).
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3.6 Effects on the growth rate of utility
Finally, we derive the growth rate of utility from consumption, u(t). We can calculate log u(t) as:
log u(t) =
Z 1
0
log
X
j
q(j; !; t)d(j; !; t)d!
=
Z 1
0
log q(j(!; t); !; t)(1=(!; t))d!
=
Z 1
0
log q(j(!; t); !; t)d!  
Z 1
0
(!; t)d!;
where (!; t) denotes the quality increment of the state-of-the-art quality in industry ! at time t. We
define the average quality as logQ(t)  R 10 log q(j(!; t); !; t)d!. The growth rate of u(t) equals that of
Q(t), which is given by:
d logQ(t)
dt
= E[log ] (IL + IF ) ;
where we can derive
E[log ] =
1  [1  log(1  )] (1  )

:
The growth rate is proportinal to aggregate R&D, (IL + IF ). Under the parameter values that we use in
the numerical example, aggregate R&D increases as followers’ R&D decreases, and thus the growth rate
rises as shown in the right panel of Fig. 4.
4 Conclusion
Incorporating stochastic quality increments and diminishing returns of R&D of leaders into the standard
quality-ladder model, we constructed a new Schumpeterian growth model where leader firms’ quality
leads over their followers are different among industries and leaders’ R&D investment depends on the
size of the quality lead. In this model, we obtained two main results. First, leaders with larger quality
leads make smaller R&D investments. This tendency is consistent with actual behaviors of previous
leader firms such as Sony and Eastman–Kodak. Second, subsidies for followers’ R&D can increase the
aggregate R&D of leaders. This theoretical result provides a rationale for the actual promotion policies
for R&D activities of new entry firms, such as Innovation Union, which is the innovation policy in the
EU.
In the present paper, we focused our attention on only R&D activities of leader firms; however, in
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reality, leader firms conduct rent-protecting activities such as patent blocking and litigation also.10 In-
corporating rent-protecting activities into the present model where the leaders are heterogeneous would
change the R&D activities of the leaders and the determination of aggregate R&D. Although this exten-
tion is beyond the scope of the present paper, it would be worth conducting in the future.
10Recent studies examined determination of aggregate R&D incorporating the rent-protecting activities (Dinopoulos and
Syropoulos, 2007; Grieben and Sener, 2009; Davis and Sener, 2012; Furukawa, 2013). Grossmann and Steger(2008) also
incorporated creation of entry barriers by incumbent firms into the R&D-based growth model and examined effects of the
activity on growth and welfare.
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A Appendix
In this appendix, we show that dR
d ~CF
< 0.
Totally differentiating (11) yields:
@G
@R
dR
d ~CF
= A   @G
@ ~CF
: (20)
First, from (11) we get @G(R)@R as follows:
@G (R)
@R
=
1
2
 
~C2F  

A
R
2!
+
h
2 ~CF +R

R
i 1
2
h
2 ~CF +R

R
i 1
2  

~CF +R

:
The first term of the RHS is negative because  = R ~CFA <  is satisfied at the equilibrium and the
second term of the RHS is also negative becauseh
2 ~CF +R

R
i 1
2  

~CF +R

< 0
, 2 ~CFR+R2   ~C2F   2 ~CFR R2 < 0
,   ~C2F < 0:
Thus, we can show that @G(R)@R < 0.
Second, we examine the sign of the term (A   dG
d ~CF
). From (11) we get @G(R)
@ ~CF
as follows:
@G (R)
@ ~CF
= R

~CF +R

 R
h
2 ~CF +R

R
i 1
2
:
Substituting this into (A   dG
d ~CF
), we get:
A   dG
d ~CF
= A  R

~CF +R

+R
h
2 ~CF +R

R
i 1
2
= A
(
   R
~CF
A
)
+R
h
2 ~CF +R

R
i 1
2  R

:
The first term of the RHS is positive because  = R ~CFA <  is satisfied in the equilibrium. The second
term is also positive. Thus, we get (A   dG
d ~CF
) > 0. As a result, we can show that dR
d ~CF
< 0.
B Appendix
We show that dI()dCF is an increasing function of I() if Condition (R) holds.
@
@I()
dI()
d ~CF
=
1
[I() +R]2

  [I() +R] dR
d ~CF
 
h
~CF   I()
i dR
d ~CF
+R

=
1
[I() + r + IF ]
2

  dR
d ~CF

~CF +R

 R

:
Therefore, we get @@I()
dI()
d ~CF
> 0 if
~CF
R

  dR
d ~CF

> R~CF+R
.
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C Appendix
In this appendix, we derive aggregate R&D by leaders IL.
Using R = r + IF , ~CF = CF =C and A = L=C, we rewrite (10) as
I() =
8><>:
q
(2 ~CF +R)R  2A  R; if 0    ;
0 if  <   :
Substituting this into (18), we get
1
IL + IF
=
Z 
0
1q
(2 ~CF +R)R  2A   r
1

d +
   

1
IF
: (21)
By using integration by substitution, we can solve the integration in the first term of the RHS of (21).
We define that x 
q
(2 ~CF +R)R  2A  r and replace  with x in the integration. Firstly we derive
the interval of the integration of x. If  = 0, x =
q
(2 ~CF +R)R  r ( x0). From the definition of x,
x = I()+ IF . Thus x = I()+ IF = IF if  = . Secondly, we derive the relation between dx and
d. Solving the equation of x for , we get
 =
1
2A
h
(2 ~CF +R)R  (x+ r)2
i
:
The total differentiation of the equation yields
d =  x+ r
A
dx:
Using them, we can rewrite the first term of the RHS of (21) as follows.Z 
0
1q
(2 ~CF +R)R  2A   r
1

d =
Z IF
x0
1
x
1


 x+ r
A

dx
=
1
A
Z IF
x0

 x+ r
x

dx
=
1
A
[ x  r log x]IFx0
=
1
A
[x0   IF + r (log x0   log IF )] :
Substituting this result into (21), we get aggregate R&D by leaders IL as a funtion of IF as follows.
1
IL + IF
=
1
A
[x0   IF + r (log x0   log IF )] +    


1
IF
:
Using this, we can get values of IL given IF easily.
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